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1Abstract
We show that an environmental regulation such as a tax on pollution can act as a collusive
device and induce stable cartelization in an oligopolistic polluting industry. We consider a
dynamic game where pollution is allowed to accumulate into a stock over time and a cartel
that includes all the ￿rms in the industry. We show that a tax on pollution emissions can make
it unpro￿table for any ￿rm to leave the cartel. Moreover the cartel formation can diminish
the welfare gain from environmental regulation. We provide an example where social welfare
under environmental regulation and collusion of ￿rms is below social welfare under a laisser-faire
policy.
JEL classi￿cations: H41, L51, Q58
Keywords: pollution tax, oligopoly, cartel formation, coalition formation, di⁄erential game
21 Introduction
Can stricter environmental regulation lead to anti-competitive behaviour amongst polluting
￿rms and induce the formation of cartels? This is now a growing concern within anti-trust
authorities.1
The question of the impact of an environmental policy on the collusive behaviour of ￿rms
is a legitimate one since it impacts ￿rms￿incentives to leave the cartel (internal stability of the
cartel) and ￿rm￿ s incentives to join a cartel (external stability). It is well known that oligopolists
can raise their pro￿ts if all ￿rms collude and engage in price ￿xing. However, it is also well
known that such a cartel may not be stable in the sense that a cartel member typically ￿nds
it pro￿table to exit the cartel and become an outsider. This is the internal stability concept
introduced from the theory of cartels (see d￿ Aspremont et al. (1983)). D￿ Aspremont et al.
(1983) and the substantial subsequent literature in the theory of coalition formation de￿ne a
stable cartel (or coalition) as a cartel that is internally and externally stable, where external
stability requires that no outsider ￿rm ￿nds it pro￿table to join the cartel. This concept
of stability has also been extensively applied in the analysis of the stability of international
environmental agreements, IEAs, (see e.g., Barrett (1994), Rubio and Ulph (2006), Carraro
and Siniscalco (1993)). The general message of coalition theory and of the applications in IEAs
is that large coalitions cannot be stable. Can this result be extended to the case of a polluting
oligopoly where a regulator implements a tax on pollution emissions? Answering this question
is a ￿rst goal of this paper. The second objective is to address the policy implications of the
1The Committee on Competition Law and Policy of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD) organized roundtable discussions on "Competition Policy and the Environment" and "Environ-
mental Regulation and Competition" in 1996 and 2006 respectively. At these proceedings, each of the members
presented speci￿c national examples of environmental regulations leading to anti-competitive behaviour. Similar
issues have been a source of concern also for the European Commission (EC). Community law provides that
environmental considerations must be integrated into all other Community policies. This includes European
competition policy. In their turn, both the national legislator and the industry have to respect competition
law in putting in place environmental initiatives and should not establish forms of collaboration, rules or prac-
tices that would constitute unjusti￿ed obstacles to competition, as stated in Chapter 7 of the Guidelines on the
applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal cooperation agreements.
3change in the collusive behaviour of ￿rms. More precisely, we need to determine the welfare
implications of the formation of a cartel. This second question is typically trivial in the context
of IEA formation. In our context it is not. In the context of IEAs each country￿ s bene￿t typically
depends on its own consumption and countries interact only through the damage they in￿ ict on
each other. Therefore, when all countries form a coalition, they internalize each other￿ s damage
and the coalition necessarily results in a gain in welfare. In the context of an oligopoly, in the
absence of pollution, the industry supplies less than the socially desirable output level. When
pollution is taken into account, the impact of collusion on social welfare, de￿ned as the sum of
consumer￿ s and producer￿ s surplus net of the damage caused by pollution, becomes ambiguous
and typically depends on the extent of the damage caused by pollution.
We show that when a tax on pollution emissions is implemented, there exists a set of
parameter values such that the cartel formed by all ￿rms in the industry is stable. We also
show that the formation of such a cartel can be detrimental to welfare. We provide an example
where the introduction of a tax on pollution emissions would be welfare improving compared to
the laisser-faire policy, in the absence of cartel formation. However, given the tax on pollution,
the comprehensive cartel, i.e. where all ￿rms are cartel members2, is stable and its formation
results in a lower welfare than under the laisser-faire policy. Thus, setting a tax on pollution
emissions, whilst good for the environment, can indeed be detrimental to overall welfare by
encouraging tacit collusion or cartel formation amongst the polluting ￿rms. This justi￿es some
of the existing concerns of the OECD, the EC and other policy makers.
In addition to looking at collusion between polluting ￿rms instead of coalitions between
countries, our paper di⁄ers from the main steam literature in the theory of coalition formation
in general and IEA formation in particular by incorporating explicitly intertemporal constraints
that agents face. Exceptions include Breton et al. (2008) and de Zeeuw (2008). Breton et al
(2008) consider the formation of an IEA in an international pollution game where signatory
2We only treat the case where all ￿rms are cartel members. Our results extend to the cases where only a
subset of ￿rms in the industry form a cartel. Since no insight is added we omit these latter cases.
4countries are assumed to be able to punish the non-signatories at a cost. They propose an
evolutionary process through which countries may gradually reach a stable agreement. They
adopt a replicator dynamics, under which evolutionary pressures are put in favor of the group
(signatories versus non-signatories) obtaining the highest payo⁄. De Zeeuw (2008) considers
the case where agents are "farsighted": when a country contemplates leaving an IEA, it takes
into account the repercussions on other countries￿adhesion to the IEA (see also Diamantoudi
and Szartsetakis (2006) for the application of the farsightedness concept in IEAs in a static
framework). He takes into account the dynamics of emissions adjustments and shows that large
and small coalitions occur only if the costs of emissions is relatively small compared to the costs
of abatement.
The dynamic pollution game we consider is borrowed from a literature on the taxation in
natural resource markets. Karp and Livernois (1992) consider the taxation of a non-renewable
resource monopoly. Benchekroun and Long (1998) extend the model to a polluting oligopoly.
It is this latter model that we use to study the impact of taxation of pollution emissions on
￿rms￿collusive behavior. We set up a di⁄erential game between N ￿rms that compete ￿ la
Cournot. Firms￿emissions are directly proportional to their output levels and accumulate into
a stock of pollution. Each ￿rm faces a unit tax on its emissions, say a carbon tax.3 Following
Karp (1992) and Benchekroun and Long (1998), to ensure time consistency of the tax policy,
we consider the case where the tax rate is indexed on the state variable of the dynamic system,
i.e. the stock of pollution in our case. Indeed, rational forward-looking governments may have
an incentive to adjust the tax rate over time based on the evolution of the damage caused by
pollution. To avoid time inconsistency issues we consider a tax indexed on the state variable,
the stock of pollution: i.e., we consider Markovian tax rules. Indeed, in the case of a non-
renewable resource monopoly, Karp and Livernois (1992) have shown that the monopoly may
3Countries that levy a carbon tax include Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden and the UK. Countries currently considering the implementation of a carbon tax include New
Zealand and the US (the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act).
5strategically manipulate a regulator implementing a tax path. This manipulation is no longer
a concern when the regulator adopts Markovian tax rules.
Section 2 presents the model. Sections 3 studies the stability of cartel formation. Section
4 gives a welfare analysis of the tax on pollution emissions. Section 5 presents concluding
remarks.
2 The Model
Consider a Cournot oligopoly with N ￿ 3 identical ￿rms that produce a homogenous good.
Each ￿rm has a constant marginal cost, c ￿ 0. Firm i￿ s output is denoted by qi and the
industry￿ s output is given by Q =
P
qi. For notational convenience, the argument of time, t;
is in general omitted throughout the paper although it is understood that all variables may be
time dependent. The inverse demand is given by:
P(Q) = P(0) ￿ Q (1)
with P(0)￿c is normalized to 1: Production of each ￿rm i generates pollution emissions denoted
by ei with ei = qi. Pollution accumulates over time and forms a stock, denoted by S with
_ S = Q ￿ ￿S and S (0) = S0 ￿ 0
where ￿ > 0 represents the natural rate of decay of the stock of pollution. The damage caused





Under laisser-faire, i.e. in the absence of environmental regulation, ￿rms ignore the damage
that their production causes to the environment. The outcome under laisser-faire corresponds
6to the outcome of a static Cournot oligopoly equilibrium that is in￿nitely repeated.
We consider an environmental regulation in the form of a per unit tax on pollution emissions
which, given the simple relationship between production and emissions, amounts to a per unit
tax on production. Each ￿rm i faces an environmental tax policy for its polluting activities
given by:
￿ (S) = ￿ + ￿S with ￿ ￿ 0:
Thus, given a tax policy ￿ (:), the tax rate charged at time t is given by ￿ (S (t)). The case
where ￿ = 0 corresponds to the case of a ￿ myopic￿ environmental regulator that does not
react to changes in the damage caused by pollution. It is highly likely that if the state of the
environment evolves, the regulator would wish to revise her tax rate. It is, therefore, sensible
in this context to consider a dynamic tax. To avoid time inconsistency issues, we consider a
tax policy or rule that is in a feedback form: the tax depends on the state variable, the stock of
pollution. Indeed, in the case of a non-renewable resource monopoly, Karp and Livernois (1992)
have shown that a regulator implementing a tax path, which depends on the calendar time and
the initial value of the state variable, may be strategically manipulated by the monopoly. This
manipulation is no longer a concern when the regulator adopts a tax policy where the rate
charged at each moment depends on the level of the state variable at that moment.
Given a tax policy ￿ (:), we determine a Markov Perfect Nash equilibrium (MPNE) of this
pollution game. Firm i takes the strategy of its competitors, Q￿i (S), as given and solves the




e￿rt[P(Q￿i(S) + qi)qi ￿ (c + ￿(S))qi]dt
subject to


















￿ for S > ￿ S
(3)
where A;B and C are coe¢ cients reported in the appendix. It can be checked that the N-tuple
vector of strategies where each ￿rm adopts the production strategy
q (S) =
1 ￿ (￿S + ￿) + V 0 (S)
1 + N









S ￿ ￿ S
￿
for 0 ￿ S ￿ ￿ S
0 for S > ￿ S
The function V (S) in (3) corresponds to the discounted sum of pro￿ts of a ￿rm along the
MPNE.






< 0 for all S 2 [0; ￿ S):
Under the MPNE above, the path of the stock of pollution is given by:
S (t) = Sss
N + (S0 ￿ Sss
N )e￿t
4For the details of the derivation of the MPNE of this di⁄erential game, we refer the reader to Benchekroun






￿ (N + 1)
￿ S (4)
and ￿ ￿ N
N+1 (A ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿: The steady state value of the stock of pollution where N is the
number of ￿rms (and where the N ￿rms are not colluding) corresponds to Sss
N and we have
Sss
N < ￿ S since ￿ < N
N+1 (A ￿ ￿) < 0.
We examine the stability of cartel formation within this dynamic game. We limit our
analysis of stability to the case where the cartel includes all the ￿rms in the industry. In the
terminology of coalition formation theory, we consider the stability of the grand coalition only.
This case is su¢ cient to highlight the collusive role that an environmental tax can play. Cases
where only a subset of ￿rms in the industry form a cartel can of course be considered as well,
however, we believe it will extensively lengthen the presentation of the results without adding
further insight into our analysis5.
The cartel is said to be stable for any N > 1; if no member has a unilateral incentive to
leave the cartel, that is, if the following holds:




The term V jN=1 (S) corresponds to the discounted sum of pro￿ts of a monopoly if the stock
of pollution is S and the tax policy is ￿ (S). Since ￿rms have the same constant marginal cost,
when all the ￿rms in the industry form a cartel, the outcome is exactly the same as if there
was a single ￿rm in the industry. The overall pro￿ts is equally split among cartel members and
each ￿rm earns
V jN=1(S)
N . The term V jN=2 (S) corresponds to the discounted sum of pro￿ts of
a ￿rm in the case of a duopoly. Since ￿rms have the same constant marginal cost, V jN=2 (S)
5Moreover, by focusing on the case where all the industry￿ s ￿rms are cartel members, we need not worry about
the pro￿tability of the cartel formation. From oligopoly theory it is known that if only a subset of the ￿rms
merge (or collude) the pro￿t of the merged entity may be smaller than the sum of the pro￿ts of the merged ￿rms
prior to the merger: the merger is then unpro￿table (see e.g., Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) or Gaudet
and Salant (1991)).
9corresponds to the pro￿ts a ￿rm would earn by staying out of the cartel while all the other
￿rms in the industry are members of the cartel.
Thus, the cartel is stable to a unilateral deviation i⁄




The threshold ^ N (S) gives the maximum number of ￿rms in an industry where a cartel (in
which all the ￿rms are members) can be sustained when the stock of pollution is S and the per
unit emission tax is ￿ (S) = ￿ + ￿S. The notion of stability we use corresponds to the widely
used stability concept of internal stability in the coalition formation literature and that was
￿rst introduced by d￿ Aspremont et al. (1983) in the case of cartel formation. In general, along
with internal stability, external stability is also analyzed. A cartel is externally stable if no
external member of the cartel ￿nds it pro￿table to join the cartel. Since we focus on the case
where all ￿rms are cartel members, only the internal stability is relevant. In the terminology of
coalition formation literature, ^ N (S) refers to the largest stable grand coalition when the stock
of pollution is S and the per unit emission tax is ￿ (S).
3 Cartel stability
We ￿rst report a straightforward result regarding the case of a uniform tax, i.e. the case where
￿ = 0 : ￿ (S) = ￿:
Proposition 1: When ￿ = 0, for all N ￿ 3, a cartel with N members is never stable.
Proof: When ￿ = 0 the outcome of the static Cournot equilibrium, where the marginal cost
of ￿rms is raised from c to c + ￿, is in￿nitely repeated and it is straightforward to check that
^ Nj￿=0 (S) = 9
4:￿
This is not surprising since, under a tax rate that is independent of the stock of pollution,
10￿rms consider the tax as a simple increase in the marginal cost. The static equilibrium outcome,
with a higher marginal cost than under laisser-faire, is just in￿nitely repeated. The value
function of each ￿rm is thus the present value of the discounted pro￿ts it earns in a static
game.6 Since the level of the constant marginal cost does not in￿ uence the cartel￿ s stability,
a uniform tax has no impact on the cartel￿ s stability in our context. Competition authorities
need not worry about the anticompetitive e⁄ect of a uniform tax on pollution emissions since
no coalition is stable. We argue in this paper that this is not true in the case of a tax rate that
evolves with the state of the game, the stock of pollution.
We refer to a tax for which ￿ > 0 as a Markovian tax. For simplicity and ease of exposition
we set ￿ = 0. The maximum number of ￿rms in an industry where a cartel (in which all the
￿rms are members) can be sustained is still given by ^ N (S) in (6) where ￿ is set to zero. An
important result that we obtain is that, contrary to static models, ^ N (S) can be arbitrarily
large. Given the complexity of the expression of ^ N (S) we ￿rst study the function ^ N (S) and
give an analytical proof of our statement for S = 0 and then treat the case for S > 0 through
an illustrative numerical example.
3.1 Cartel stability at S = 0
The expression of ^ N (0) can be obtained by determining V jN=1 (0) and V jN=2 (0) using (3)
and substituting into ^ N (S) in (6). We only report here its properties that are relevant to
our analysis. We note that ^ N (0) is homogenous of degree zero in (￿;r;￿) and, therefore,
without loss of generality we normalize one of these three parameters. We choose the following
normalization: ￿ = 1. We are unable to derive the behavior of ^ Nj￿=1 (0) as a function of the
parameters ￿ and r at any positive values of ￿ and r. However, we have the following.




the tax rate on pollution emissions is constant, for any N ￿ 3 no cartel is stable.
11Lemma 1:
(i) ^ Nj￿=1 (0) is a continuous function of ￿ and r:
(ii) For any ￿ > 0; we have the following:
lim
r!0+




Proof: Substituting ￿ = 1 into ^ N (S) in (6) gives the following:
^ Nj￿=1 (0) =
64(r + 1)





(4r + 8)(r + 2￿ + 2)
￿2





(r + 2￿ + 2)(9r + 2￿ + 18). Lemma 1 (i) and (ii) follow directly from (7):￿
We can now state the main result of this section.
Proposition 2: For any N ￿ 3; there exists ~ ￿N > 0 and ~ r￿N > 0 such that for any ￿ > ~ ￿N
and r < ~ r￿N a cartel that includes all the N ￿rms in the industry is stable.
Proof: Proposition 2 follows directly from Lemma 1(i) and 1(ii). Indeed, consider
~ ￿N ￿ 4N ￿ 9
then choosing ￿ = ~ ￿N + " with " > 0 yields after simple but tedious calculations
lim
r!0+




Continuity of ^ Nj￿=1;￿=~ ￿N+" (0) with respect to r completes the proof.￿
This result is in sharp contrast with the typical result obtained within a static framework
12where a cartel is never stable if the total number of players exceeds 2.7 When the dynamics of
the stock of pollution is used as an indicator upon which the tax rate is based, a cartel of any
size can be stable if the tax is su¢ ciently sensitive to the stock of pollution and the discount
rate is small enough.
We would like to point out a similarity and a di⁄erence of our result with the existing folk
theorem in repeated games where ￿rms can use strategies that allow for punishment. In the
latter case it is well known that cooperation can be sustained if agents are patient enough.
The di⁄erence with our result is that, in our framework, although ￿rms￿strategies do not allow
for punishment or require knowledge of any part of the history of the game, the tax plays a
disciplinary role. While a simple constant tax rate cannot lead to a stable cartel formation, in
the case where a tax is adjusted to the stock of pollution, it can play the role of a punishment
rule that helps sustain the cartel. This was not a priori straightforward since a tax negatively
a⁄ects both the cartel and the potential deviator. However, since deviation from the collusive
output path generates more pollution, in the case of a Markovian tax rule, the tax rate increases
over time following a ￿rm￿ s exit from the cartel (which is not the case under a constant tax).
This makes the deviation more costly than under a constant tax rate, and, thereby, helps sustain
collusion.
We have, thus far, normalized ￿ to 1. If we normalize r to 1 instead, we obtain the following.
Lemma 2:
(i) ^ Njr=1 (0) is a continuous function of ￿ and ￿:
(ii) For any ￿ > 0; we have the following:
lim
￿!1







13Proof: For r = 1; we have the following:
^ Njr=1 (0) =
64(￿ + 1)
2 (￿ + 3)
2
￿￿p
(8￿ + 4)(2￿ + 2￿ + 1) + 2
￿2





(2￿ + 2￿ + 1)(18￿ + 2￿ + 9):
Lemma 2(i) follows directly from (8): Lemma 2(ii) obtains by taking the appropriate limits of
(8):￿
The following proposition follows from Lemma 2.
Proposition 2b: For any N > 0; there exists ~ ￿N ￿ 1
4
￿
N ￿ 4 +
p
N (N ￿ 4)
￿
> 0 and
~ ￿~ ￿N > 0 such that for any ￿ > ~ ￿N and ￿ > ~ ￿~ ￿N a cartel that includes all the N ￿rms in the
industry is stable.
Proof: This follows from Lemma 2 and the fact that








3.2 Cartel Stability for S > 0
We have shown that a cartel that includes all the ￿rms in the industry can be stable when the
initial stock of pollution is zero. We now check the stability of the cartel at positive levels of
the stock of pollution.
As long as r tends to zero, we ￿nd that, the initial level of the stock does not play a role,
as shown by (9). Indeed, we have
lim
r!0+
^ Nj￿=~ ￿N+" (S) = N +
1
4
" > N for all S 2 [0; ￿ Sj￿=~ ￿N+") and for " > 0. (9)
This is intuitive: as r tends to zero, for any initial stock of pollution, the importance of the
14long run bene￿t from collusion increases and dominates the short-run bene￿t from staying out
of the cartel.
Next, we consider strictly positive values of r and investigate the role of S0 on the cartel￿ s
stability. Suppose that at a given initial stock of pollution, S0 < Sss
1 ; the cartel is stable
(I (S0) < 0); is it true that as the stock of pollution adjusts from S0 to the steady state level,
Sss
1 ; we have I (S) < 0 over [S0;Sss
1 ]? Obviously, a similar question arises for S0 > Sss
1 .






(4N ￿ 9)(￿S ￿ 1)
2 > 0:
Thus, for su¢ ciently large values of the discount rate, r; we obtain the same result as the
uniform tax case. That is, a cartel is never stable for N ￿ 3:
For r > 0 and ￿nite, the expressions of I (S), Sss and ￿ S are too cumbersome to be tractable
analytically. We, therefore, illustrate our ￿ndings through a numerical example where we ￿x
N = 3; ￿ = 3:5 and ￿ = 1. When N = 3; we have ~ ￿N = 3: We have chosen ￿ to exceed ~ ￿N.
This ensures that when r is small enough, the cartel is stable at S = 0.





SS SS S3 S1
Figure 1: I(S) for r = 1
I(S)




; we have I (S) > 0; and thus the cartel is unstable at all
stock levels.







Figure 2: I(S) for r = 0.2
At r = 0:2; the cartel forms at the non-cooperative steady state, Sss
3 ; but breaks down as the
stock decreases.8





Figure 3: I(S) for r = 0.15
S1 S3 S|N=1
SS
8There are possibly stable cartels formed by only a subset of the industry￿ s ￿rms.
16For r = 0:15; the cartel is stable throughout the transition phase, that is, starting from the
non-cooperative steady state, it remains stable until the steady state under collusion is reached.




SS SS S|N=1 S1 S3
0
Figure 4: I(S) for r = 0.1
For r = 0:1; the cartel is stable for all S0:
We have checked that this behaviour of the stability of the cartel holds for several other
numerical examples that we have considered.
The main policy implication of the results derived in this section is that, with a tax on
pollution emissions, competition authorities cannot rely on individual ￿rms￿incentives to cheat
on a collusive agreement to prevent the formation of a cartel.
4 Welfare Analysis
Since a tax on pollution emissions can render a cartel stable, it is now relevant to address the
following question, in line with the concerns of the OECD and the EC: Can stricter environ-
mental policy have a detrimental e⁄ect on welfare by encouraging anti-competitive behaviour?
After all, collusion among polluters results in a reduction of industry output. Because of the
negative externality generated by production it is not clear that a decrease in industry output
17is at the detriment of social welfare.
Instantaneous social welfare is assumed to be w = U(Q) ￿ cQ ￿ D(S); where U(Q) is the




P (X)dX ￿ cQ ￿ D(S)
or












Given the complexity of the integral (10); it is not possible to determine a general set of
conditions under which the formation of a cartel is welfare-improving. Therefore, we consider
the numerical example of the previous section, setting N = 3; r = 0:1; and ￿ = 1: We have
checked that similar results hold for other parameter values. We examine welfare under three
scenarios. In Scenario 1, we assume that ￿rms behave non-cooperatively and the tax on pollu-
tion emissions is zero. This scenario corresponds to the outcome of a laisser-faire policy since,
in the absence of a tax, the cartel is unstable. In Scenario 2, we assume that ￿rms behave
non-cooperatively and the regulator imposes a tax on pollution emissions with ￿ = 3:5. This
corresponds to the outcome expected by an environmental regulator that does not anticipate
the formation of the cartel. In Scenario 3, the regulator imposes a tax on pollution emissions
with ￿ = 3:5 and ￿rms are assumed to form a cartel. From our analysis in section 3, for
￿ = 3:5 the cartel is indeed stable, and therefore Scenario 3 would be the prevailing outcome
if a tax is implemented. We give below, for S0 = 0; in the numerical example considered, the
expressions of the discounted sum of welfare as functions of the damage parameter ￿ for the
18di⁄erent Scenarios 1, 2 and 3 respectively:
WjN=3;￿=0 = 4:688 ￿ 2:435￿
WjN=3;￿=3:5 = 1:873 ￿ 0:187￿
and
WjN=1;￿=3:5 = 1:136 ￿ 0:062￿
We ￿nd that there exist ￿1; ￿2 and ￿3; where 0 < ￿1 < ￿2 < ￿3; such that the following
hold:
(i) For ￿ 2 [￿1;￿3]; welfare under Scenario 1 is lower than that under Scenario 2. In the
absence of cartelization, the imposition of a tax on pollution emissions is welfare improving.
(ii) For ￿ 2 [0;￿3]; welfare under Scenario 3 is lower than under Scenario 2. Given the
imposition of a tax on pollution emissions, the cartel formation induced through environmental
regulation is welfare reducing for all ￿ 2 [0;￿3].
(iii) For ￿ 2 [￿1;￿2]; welfare under Scenario 3 is lower than under Scenario 1. The decrease
in welfare due to cartelization of the industry can lower welfare below its level under laisser-faire.
For S0 = 0; in the numerical example considered, we have ￿1 = 1:252; ￿2 = 1:497 and
￿3 = 5:903: For ￿ 2 [￿1;￿2]; the environmental regulator would expect the imposition of the tax
to be welfare improving (since WjN=3;￿=3:5 > WjN=3;￿=0), if it did not take into consideration
the possibility of cartelization of the industry. However, if the tax triggered the formation of
the cartel, which is stable for this range of ￿; welfare would fall below the laisser-faire level
(since WjN=1;￿=3:5 < WjN=3;￿=0).




we have that the imposition of the tax on pollution emissions results, through the formation of
the cartel, in a level of welfare smaller than that under the laisser-faire policy.
190 S|N=1, α = 3.5
W|N = 3, α = 3.5
W|N = 1, α = 3.5
W|N = 3, α = 0




We have shown that the implementation of a tax on pollution emissions can modify substantially
the collusive behaviour amongst polluting ￿rms. It is particularly important to understand the
implications of having a Markovian tax since environmental policies are likely to be more tied
to some index of aggregate pollution levels, such as the stock of pollution. Under a uniform
tax rate, the cartel is never stable as long as there are more than two ￿rms in the industry.
However, if the tax rate evolves with the state of the pollution damage and is indexed on
aggregate pollution levels such as the stock of pollution, we showed that the cartel that includes
all the ￿rms in industry can be stable.
The collusive behavior induced by the tax on pollution emissions can reduce the gain in
welfare that the environmental regulation is supposed to achieve. The decrease in welfare from
cartelization can even lead to a level of welfare that is lower than under the laisser-faire policy.
Therefore, when designing regulatory interventions in the context where pollution can have a
lasting e⁄ect, such as carbon emissions, it is important to take into account the impact of the
20intervention on the market structure and the behaviour of ￿rms.
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Appendix:




AS2 + BS + C (11)
where A;B and C are computed using the undetermined coe¢ cient technique (see Dockner et
al. (2000) for a general treatment of di⁄erential games and Benchekroun and Long (1998) for
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